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The decision from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on April 16, 2009, in the case of A.V. v. iParadigns, LLC is 
the latest in a string of judicial rulings about 
“fair use” that employs the concept of “trans-
formative” use to cover “functional” uses 
different from the original in a manner that is 
troubling both intellectually and practically.
Intellectually, these rulings stretch the natu-
ral meaning of “transformative” well beyond 
the bounds of common sense — and beyond, 
I contend, the meaning intended by the jurist 
whose writing gave rise to the development 
of this trend in copyright interpretation in the 
first place.  Practically, they open a Pandora’s 
box out of which all sorts of legal mischief 
may ensue — and may further contribute to 
the public’s already severe lack of confidence 
in the unpredictability of “fair use” decisions 
in the courts.
In what is undoubtedly one of the most 
influential articles ever published in a law 
review by a sitting judge, “Toward a Fair Use 
Standard” (Harvard Law Review, March 1990), 
Pierre N. Leval begins by admitting that the 
reversal on appeal of two of his decisions as 
a district court judge (in Salinger v. Random 
House, Inc. [1987] and New Era Publica-
tions Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co. [1988]) had 
led him to ponder the need for “a cogent set 
of governing principles” that could get judges 
like him from simply deciding cases “upon ad 
hoc perceptions of justice without a permanent 
framework” to help guide their interpretations. 
His effort to develop “a fair use standard” takes 
off from his understanding 
of “the objectives of copy-
right law” in the United 
States as being basically 
“utilitarian” in nature, viz., 
viewing copyright owner-
ship not as a natural right of 
the author but as “designed 
rather to stimulate activ-
ity and progress in the arts 
for the intellectual enrich-
ment of the public.”  The 
temporary monopoly that 
copyright law invests in 
authors is aimed at motivating them to create 
new works, but if exercised in too sweeping 
a fashion, that monopoly can undermine the 
creativity of others that builds on the original 
authors’ works, and hence “fair use” provides 
a kind of safety valve preventing copyright 
from becoming counterproductive in carrying 
out the Constitutional mandate “to promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”  As 
such, fair use “is a necessary part of the overall 
design” of copyright law, not just a “bizarre, 
occasionally tolerated departure” from it.
In Leval’s view, the key to keeping copy-
right interpretation in line with the Constitu-
tional mandate lies in placing the concept of 
“transformative use” front and center.  As he 
defines it, “the use must be of a character that 
serves the copyright objective of stimulating 
productive thought and public instruction 
without excessively diminishing the incentives 
for creativity.”  Leval gives pride of place to 
this concept as he sees it embodied in the first 
of the four factors set forth in Section 107’s ar-
ticulation of the considerations that courts must 
bear in mind when reaching a decision about 
whether any particular use is fair.  This factor, 
“the purpose and character of the secondary 
use,” he calls at one point “the soul of fair use.” 
According to Leval, “one must assess each of 
the issues that arise in considering a fair use 
defense in the light of the governing purpose 
of copyright law,” which is manifested most 
straightforwardly in this idea of “transforma-
tive use.”  Although no one factor alone is 
determinative in a fair use analysis, that a use 
is transformative in this sense creates a strong 
presumption that it is fair, and the other three 
factors would need to weigh heavily against 
a use being fair to override this presumption. 
The use’s transformative character “lies at the 
heart of the fair user’s case.”
What did Leval himself mean by “transfor-
mative”?  The way he lays out his argument, 
in reflecting on its application to the Salinger 
and New Era cases (which involved quota-
tions from authors J.D. Salinger and L. Ron 
Hubbard in biographies written about them), 
and the examples he gives 
of transformative uses, both 
lead naturally to the conclu-
sion that such uses must 
themselves involve acts of 
creation that go beyond the 
original.  “If…the secondary 
use adds value to the origi-
nal — if the quoted matter 
is used as raw material, 
transformed in the creation 
of new information, new 
aesthetics, new insights 
and understandings — this 
is the very type of activity that the fair use 
doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment 
of society.”  Other examples Leval gives in-
clude “criticizing the quoted work, exposing 
the character of the original author, proving 
a fact, or summarizing an idea argued in the 
original in order to defend or rebut it,” and he 
also cites “parody, symbolism, and aesthetic 
declarations” as involving transformative use. 
All of these may be understood as “transfor-
mative” in a perfectly straightforward sense 
of that word.
The ascension of transformative use to its 
current prominence in fair use jurisprudence 
no doubt is attributable to the huge influence 
that the case of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc. (1994) has had on subsequent court deci-
sions in this arena.  Probably no single case has 
been cited more frequently in cases following it 
where fair use is at issue.  (The opinion in this 
Supreme Court case was written by Justice 
David Souter, soon to retire from the bench.) 
This case, concerning whether 2 Live Crew’s 
parody of Roy Orbison’s song “Pretty Wom-
an” could be considered fair, turned crucially 
on “whether the new work [in this instance, 2 
Live Crew’s rap rendition of the song] merely 
‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original cre-
ation…, or instead adds something new, with 
a further purpose or different character, alter-
ing the first with new expression, meaning, or 
message; it asks, in other words, whether and 
to what extent the new work is ‘transforma-
tive’.”  This quotation is immediately followed 
by a reference to Leval’s article.  It is one of 
seven times that article is cited in the text of 
the decision, and another six citations occur 
in the footnotes.  No other single secondary 
source is cited more frequently.  The impact 
of Leval’s reasoning on this case is obvious 
to anyone reading the decision who is familiar 
with Leval’s article.  The interpretation of the 
parody as a justifiable “transformative” use of 
the original song is the linchpin of the decision, 
sufficiently powerful to overcome the facts that 
the parody itself was done for “commercial” 
purposes and that the work used was “expres-
sive” in nature — factors that usually count 
against a use’s being seen as fair.
In the Second Circuit, where Leval now 
serves on the Court of Appeals, another case 
was decided in 2006 along the same lines.  Bill 
Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd. 
pitted the owner of posters of The Grateful 
Dead advertising their concerts against the 
publisher of a coffee-table book titled The 
Grateful Dead: The Illustrated Trip where the 
posters, in reduced size, were reproduced as 
part of a cultural history of the rock group.  The 
very first paragraph of the four-factor analysis 
cites Judge Leval’s article and quotes the 
sentence from the Campbell case that appears 
above.  (It should be noted that Leval was not 
one of the three judges hearing this appeal, so 
he was not citing himself).  Here, against the 
plaintiff’s claim that “merely placing poster 
images along a timeline is not a transforma-
tive use,” the court argued that DK’s use of 
the images “as historical artifacts to docu-
ment and represent the actual occurrence of 
Grateful Dead concert events featured on 
Illustrated Trip’s timeline” was “transforma-
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tively different” from the “original artistic 
and promotional purpose” and did involve 
creative design to produce a “collage effect” 
using both images and text in such a way as to 
“enrich the presentation of the cultural history 
of The Grateful Dead.”  Thus, be it noted, the 
secondary use was itself a creative act that in 
its very creativity had transformed the original 
posters to use them for a different purpose, his-
torical reconstruction rather than promotion or 
artistic expression for its own sake.  This case 
conforms perfectly well to Leval’s line of rea-
soning and uses “transformative” in its natural 
sense.  Here, again, although DK’s book was 
published for “commercial” gain, the images 
reproduced the posters in their entirety (albeit 
in reduced size), and the posters qualified as 
“expressive” works — all three factors usually 
counting against fair use — the “transforma-
tive” nature of the use trumped other valid 
considerations.
The issue of transformative use has come 
up in cases in circuits other than the Second, 
for instance, in Video Pipeline v. Buena Vista 
decided on appeal in the Third Circuit in 2003. 
Video Pipeline was in the business of supply-
ing clips from movies as trailers for home video 
stores; after a license to use trailers created by 
Disney had lapsed, Video Pipeline made short 
clips of its own directly from the movies and 
argued that these were protected as fair use, 
in part because they were “transformative,” 
serving “only to provide information about the 
movies to Internet users or as advertisements 
for the company’s retail Website clients” rather 
than fulfilling the “aesthetic and entertainment 
purpose” of the original movies.  Besides point-
ing out that the clips had no purpose different 
from the trailers that Buena Vista itself sup-
plied, and that they therefore interfered with the 
market for the latter, the court also noted “the 
absence of creative ingenuity in the creation of 
the clips” in finding no “transformative use” 
involved here to weigh against the patently 
“commercial” purpose of Video Pipeline’s 
clips.  This lack of creativity in the secondary 
use aligns this case also with Judge Leval’s 
reasoning about what “transformation” means 
in copyright law.
Some judges out west, however, either 
didn’t grasp the plain meaning of “transforma-
tive use” as Leval explicated it in his article or 
else decided to be “transformative” themselves 
by creating a new and quite different meaning 
for the term, which is neither a logical exten-
sion of Leval’s original nor a commonsensical 
interpretation of it.  Enamored, as they seem 
to have been, by the vast public benefit they 
perceive the Internet to have brought society, 
and willing to excuse just about anything that 
Google does in pursuit of the overriding objec-
tive of preserving that benefit to its maximum 
extent, many judges in the Ninth Circuit have 
devised their own idiosyncratic interpretation 
of “transformative” as meaning anything that 
serves a different function from the original 
copyrighted work.  Crucially, the different 
function need  involve no creativity at all; it 
can be the result of a purely mechanical process 
performed by a computer to search Websites 
and index their contents.  If it took some ge-
nius to create the software that performs the 
function, the implementation of it nevertheless 
requires no human creativity whatsoever.
Hence, thanks to the Ninth Circuit’s pros-
tration before the gods of cyberspace, we have 
the cases of Kelly v. Arriba Soft (2002) and 
Perfect 10 v. Google (2007), both of which cite 
Campbell frequently.  The first of these cases 
involved a photographer suing a company that 
had used its Internet search engine to compile a 
database of images in the form of “thumbnails,” 
some of which came from the photographer’s 
own Website.  Despite the admittedly “com-
mercial” purpose of Arriba Soft’s database, 
the court ruled that the thumbnail images 
did not serve the same expressive purpose as 
Kelly’s original images but, instead, facilitated 
access to images on the Internet.  “Because 
Arriba’s use is not superseding Kelly’s use 
but, rather, has created a different purpose for 
the images, Arriba’s use is transformative.” 
And, being transformative, this use outweighs 
not only the “commercial” purpose of the da-
tabase but also the facts that the works copied 
are “expressive” in nature and were copied in 
their entirety (albeit at reduced size).  The court 
took pains to emphasize the public benefit of 
Arriba’s activity as “enhancing information 
gathering techniques on the Internet.”
The facts in Perfect 10 v. Google were 
very similar, but not identical.  Again, it was 
a company’s search engine locating images 
at Websites, storing them as thumbnails, and 
indexing them for the purpose of easy access. 
Perfect 10 was in the business of supplying 
photographs of nude models to customers via 
the Internet and, as Kelly had earlier, sued for 
infringement.  Unlike Kelly, however, Perfect 
10 did have a market for reduced-size images 
through another company that was authorized 
to license their use on cell phones.  (It speaks 
to the lack of imagination of the Arriba judges 
that they could not envision any such market 
for thumbnails).  One might think that this 
was indeed a significant difference.  The court, 
however, decided that for lack of evidence that 
people had downloaded the thumbnail images 
from Google for use on their cell phones, 
“this potential harm to Perfect 10’s market 
remains hypothetical.”  This is hardly in keep-
ing with the way the fourth factor is normally 
interpreted and reeks of special pleading.  The 
court was clearly intent on reaching the conclu-
sion it wanted to reach, based on its view of 
what benefits the public generally, and nothing 
like this was going to deter it from that goal. 
Such was its hubris that, not merely content 
to use Kelly as precedent, the court went the 
extra mile and opined that “Google’s use of 
thumbnails is highly transformative” (empha-
sis added).  How did it justify this hyperbole? 
Not only does a search engine provide “social 
benefit by incorporating an original work into 
a new work, namely, an electronic reference 
tool.  Indeed, a search engine may be more 
transformative than a parody because a search 
engine provides an entirely new use for the 
original work, while a parody typically has 
the same entertainment purpose as the original 
work”.  What a breathtaking leap of logic!  We 
are well beyond any commonsensical meaning 
of “transformative” here as one creator build-
ing upon the work of another creator, which is 
clearly what Pierre Leval had in mind when 
he tried to put this concept forward as “the soul 
of fair use.”  Search engines do not create in 
any meaningful sense; they merely follow the 
instructions programmed into them and go 
about their business, in this instance of locat-
ing and indexing content on the Web.  Yet the 
Ninth Circuit judges have somehow gotten it 
into their heads that a purely mechanical func-
tion can be “transformative.”  They have been 
misled by the superficial analogies promoted 
by the slippery use of the term “purpose.”  Had 
they focused on the “creative” element that 
Leval emphasized as crucial to the meaning 
of “transformative,” they could never have 
reached the conclusions they did.
What looked to be a disease confined to 
the west coast’s Ninth Circuit has, like the 
swine flu, now begun to spread geographically 
eastward.  The recent decision in the Fourth 
Circuit, which covers states from West Virginia 
to South Carolina, takes a page right out of the 
Ninth Circuit’s book.  Its discussion of the first 
factor, which quotes Leval’s article and the 
Campbell case prominently, follows the lead 
of Campbell’s Leval-inspired dictum that “the 
more transformative the new work, the less will 
be the significance of other factors, like com-
mercialism, that may weigh against a finding 
of fair use,” and it hews to the Ninth Circuit’s 
open-ended construal of “different purpose” 
as encompassing noncreative functional dif-
ference.  The defendant iParadigm owns and 
operates the Turnitin Plagiarism Detection 
Service used by many high schools and col-
leges that allows teachers to compare student 
essays against a large database of stored student 
papers and journal articles.  Several students 
had brought suit against iParadigm for its 
use of papers they had written in high school. 
Among other points, their lawyers argued that 
iParadigm’s use of the papers could not be 
transformative “because the archiving process 
does not add anything to the work” (emphasis 
in original).  The appeals court, however, 
rebutted this argument by calling it “clearly 
misguided.  The use of a copyrighted work need 
not alter or augment the work to be transforma-
tive in nature.  Rather, it can be transformative 
in function or purpose without actually adding 
to the original work.”  The court cites Perfect 
10 v. Google as its authority for this position, 
quoting in particular the passage that urged the 
functional use in that case to be “highly trans-
formative.”  We can see here how far the courts 
have strayed from Leval’s own understanding 
of what is required for a use to be transforma-
tive.  The court concluded its analysis of the 
first factor by saying that “iParadigm’s use 
of these works was completely unrelated to 
expressive content and was instead aimed at 
detecting and discouraging plagiarism.”  As 
with the Ninth Circuit cases, the court here 
went on to interpret the other factors in light 
of its construal of the use as transformative. 
Thus the student papers’ being “expressive” 
in nature didn’t hold much weight because 
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“iParadigm’s use of the works…[was] un-
related to any creative component,” its being 
merely a computer-facilitated comparison of 
the content of submitted student essays with 
the papers stored in the database.  Nor did it 
matter that the entirety of the student papers 
were being used in this process because it was 
not their “expressive” content that was being 
exploited, only the “historical fact” of plagia-
rism that it was the aim of the process to detect. 
Urging that “the transformative nature of the 
use is relevant to the market effect factor,” the 
court dismissed the plaintiffs’ arguments for 
effect on potential markets as “theoretical and 
speculative,” just as the Ninth Circuit had done 
in the Perfect 10 case.  Clearly, the initial de-
termination that the use was “transformative” 
colored the court’s construal of all the other 
factors, diminishing if not entirely negating 
their impact on the finding of fair use.  And, 
just as clearly, the court was set on reaching 
this conclusion because of its favorable view 
of the public benefits afforded by the Turnitin 
system, supporting the district court’s opinion 
that it “provides a substantial public benefit 
through the network of educational institutions 
using Turnitin.”
This line of cases transforming the common 
meaning of “transformative” championed by 
Judge Leval into an all-purpose reading of 
“purpose” as anything that makes a function-
ally different use of the copyrighted work, 
however uncreative that use may be, offers a 
textbook example of Georgia Harper’s story 
about how judges approach fair use cases, by 
making up their minds first about what benefits 
the public most and then reasoning backward 
through the four-factor analysis to arrive at 
that predetermined conclusion.  (See Harper’s 
“Google This!” at http://www.utsystem.edu/
ogc/intellectualproperty/googlethis.htm).  That 
this is indeed a fair charge to make against the 
Ninth Circuit is confirmed by one of its own 
members, Judge Alex Kozinski, who accused 
his fellow jurists in his dissent in Perfect 10 v. 
Visa International, an extension of the Perfect 
10 v. Google case, of subscribing to this theory 
of what public policy requires:  “(1) to promote 
the continued development of the Internet and 
other interactive media [and] (2) to preserve 
the vibrant and competitive free market that 
presently exists for the Internet and other 
interactive computer services, unfettered by 
Federal or State regulation.”  Judge Kozinski 
also reminded his colleagues that it is the role 
of the legislature, not the judiciary, to decide 
what U.S. public policy should be.
Contrast the Ninth Circuit’s obeisance to 
functionality so long as it provides a perceived 
public benefit with the reasoning of Judge Jon 
Newman, Leval’s colleague on the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals, who wrote about 
photocopying in the famous American Geo-
physical Union v. Texaco, Inc. (1994) case: 
“We would seriously question whether the fair 
use analysis that has developed with respect to 
works of authorship alleged to use portions of 
copyrighted material is precisely applicable to 
copies produced by mechanical means.  The 
traditional fair use analysis, now codified in 
section 107, developed in an effort to adjust 
the competing interests of the authors — the 
author of the original copyrighted work and 
the author of the secondary work that ‘copies’ 
a portion of the original work in the course of 
producing what is claimed to be a new work. 
Mechanical ‘copying’ of an entire document, 
made readily feasible by the advent of xe-
rography..., is obviously an activity entirely 
different from creating a work of authorship. 
Whatever social utility copying of this sort 
achieves, it is not concerned with creative 
authorship (italics added).”  This reasoning 
entirely comports with the argument of Judge 
Leval in his 1990 article.  And it runs directly 
counter to the Ninth Circuit’s (and now the 
Fourth Ciurcuit’s) intellectually obfuscating 
attempt to insert claims of social utility into 
the bowels of fair use analysis.
This is not to argue that references to the 
greater public good have no place in fair use 
analysis at all.  Indeed, it was Leval’s explicit 
aim to find a principled way of interpreting fair 
use that would reflect the Constitutional objec-
tive of having copyright law serve the public 
good of promoting the progress of knowledge. 
But, unlike the Ninth and Fourth Circuits, the 
Second has made that attempt without distorting 
fundamental aspects of copyright or departing 
from the ordinary use of language.  Still, it 
may be that Leval’s approach is itself not fully 
adequate to the full range of considerations that 
fair use analysis needs to take into account, and 
it may have created as much harm as benefit by 
suggesting that, as the “soul of fair use,” the 
“transformative” nature of a secondary use can 
be deployed to diminish the importance of the 
other three factors.  In a comment on Leval’s 
article titled “Fair’s Fair” in the same issue of the 
Harvard Law Review, Lloyd Weinreb cogently 
argues that Leval errs in trying to force all fair 
use analysis into the Procrustean bed of “the 
utilitarian premises of the copyright scheme 
as a whole” and suggests instead that besides 
“the general purpose of copyright…, a number 
of other factors also have to be taken into ac-
count, among which customary practice and the 
prevailing understanding of what constitutes 
fair conduct in the circumstances are  the most 
important.”  Only with this more expansive ap-
proach to fair use, Weinreb urges, can one make 
sense of the decisions in two of the leading cases 
about fair use decided by the Supreme Court: 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Stud-
ies, Inc. (1984) and Harper & Row, Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises (1985).
Straightforward comparison of Sony 
and Harper & Row according to the 
statutory factors has puzzling results.  
The “purpose and character” of the use 
in Sony was private; in Harper & Row, 
the use was news reporting, a public pur-
pose with unusually strong constitution-
al protection.  The copyrighted works in 
Sony included fictional works, presum-
ably entitled to greater protection than 
factual works; Harper & Row involved 
an account of actual events. In Sony, 
the whole work was copied; in Harper 
& Row, fewer than four hundred words 
from a manuscript of 200,000 words.  
Although the practice of time-shifting 
television programs was extremely 
widespread, the Court in Sony held that 
the plaintiffs had not met their burden 
of proving that “some meaningful likeli-
hood of future harm exists.”  In Harper 
& Row, the plaintiff’s loss was $12,500 
for a license to publish an excerpt from 
the copyrighted work.  On the surface 
of things, Harper & Row looks like a 
much better candidate for a finding of 
fair use than Sony.  Yet the results in the 
two cases, decided just sixteen months 
apart, are the reverse.
Needless to say, Leval’s approach does not 
work well for these two cases.  The time-shift-
ing at issue in the Sony case is not “transfor-
mative” at all in Leval’s sense (though might 
be seen as compatible with the Ninth Circuit’s 
functional construal).  By contrast, the use of 
an excerpt from President Ford’s memoir in 
The Nation’s article is a classic example of 
“transformative” use, further blessed by hav-
ing “news reporting” cited explicitly in the 
preamble of Section 107 as one of the “pur-
poses” where fair use most comes into play as a 
limitation on the rights of the copyright owner. 
Key to the outcomes of the two cases were the 
other considerations that Weinreb alleges to 
be important also:  “customary practice” in 
the case of Sony (because time-shifting for 
private viewing in the home was a commonly 
accepted practice) and “fair conduct” in the 
case of Harper & Row (where The Nation 
was charged with obtaining a copy of Ford’s 
unpublished manuscript by theft).
Weinreb’s argument thus allows for a 
broader range of factors to be taken into con-
sideration in arriving at decisions about fair 
use, and his approach suggests that they just be 
straightforwardly put on the table, rather than 
smuggled in through the back door of Leval’s 
utilitarian principles.  The error of the Ninth 
and Fourth Circuits, then, may be viewed as 
following Leval’s approach of stressing the 
primacy of “transformative” use but having 
to distort it in order to import these broader 
considerations of public benefit seen by these 
courts as deriving from computer technology, 
which could more simply have been brought 
forward as separate points to bear in mind. 
How could this be done?  Both Leval and 
Weinreb offer suggestions for harmonizing 
copyright law and the public interest.  Leval’s 
recommendation is to recognize the author’s 
entitlement to compensation for creative effort 
by awarding damages but to deny an injunction 
against the use if it is indeed “transformative” 
and strongly in the public interest.  Weinreb 
agrees that this recommendation “has merit.” 
For a situation “when a practice as widespread 
as taping television programs is at stake, how-
ever, resort to a compulsory license — the 
consequence of withholding an injunction and 
awarding damages — is more appropriately a 
legislative task.  Congress has provided for a 
compulsory license in similar circumstances.” 
Nimmer on Copyright, discussing the vexed 
issue of photocopying arising from Williams 
& Wilkins Co. v. United States (1975), offers 
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another suggestion for balancing the interests 
of copyright owners and the public:  “even in 
copyright actions against nongovernmental 
entities, where the remedy of permanent in-
junction is available, a court could withhold 
injunctive relief and provide instead for the 
mandatory payment of a royalty as a condition 
of further photocopying,” i.e., “a judificially 
created compulsory license.”
Nimmer on Copyright proposes a “func-
tional test” as a means for deciding when 
certain uses are fair:  “if, regardless of medium, 
the defendant’s work, although containing sub-
stantially similar material, performs a different 
function than that of the plaintiff’s, the defense 
of fair use may be invoked.”  One example 
given is where “unauthorized reproduction of 
chorus lyrics of songs were held noninfringing 
fair use where such reproductions appeared in 
magazine articles” rather than in sheet music 
competing for the same market as the original. 
This “functional test” was inspired by a sug-
gestion from  Judge Richard Posner, who 
urged the recognition that “copying that is 
complementary to the copyrighted work…is 
fair use, but copying that is a substitute for the 
copyrighted work…, or for derivative works 
from the copyrighted work, is not fair use”. 
This approach, though it may seem superfi-
cially similar to the Ninth Circuit’s because of 
the reference to functionality, is in fact quite 
different.  Rather than being tortured out of the 
notion of “transformative” use, this “functional 
test” is instead “viewed as an expansion of the 
fourth fair use factor…[and] vindicates the 
oft-cited assertion…that that factor emerges 
as the central fair use determinant, in result 
if not always in stated rationale.”  Nimmer, 
like Weinreb, looks at some Supreme Court 
cases whose outcomes appear to be quite puz-
zling without being understood in terms of this 
“functional test.”
Consider the four Supreme Court cases 
decided under the fair use doctrine in the 
decade beginning in 1984.  Each of the 
three initial fair use factors defies char-
acterization that can consistently explain 
the court’s ultimate conclusion in those 
cases.  The first factor reveals conflict-
ing impulses, whether scrutinized as to 
commercial use or to transformative use, 
or according to the statutory preamble.  
On the commercial scale, Nation and 
Abend [Stewart v. Abend, 1990] both 
disallow fair use for commercial uses, 
whereas Sony allows it in a noncom-
mercial context; but Campbell allows 
fair use for commercial exploitation.  
On the transformative scale, Campbell 
weighs in favor of fair use for a produc-
tive use, yet Nation and Abend rule 
against fair use for what is admittedly 
a productive use; even more strangely, 
Sony allows fair use for a nonproductive 
use.  In terms of the presumptively fair 
activities enumerated in the preamble 
to Section 107, the activity in Camp-
bell constituted “criticism, comment,” 
and hence, inclines towards fair use, 
whereas the activity in Abend met none 
of the preamble specifications and was 
held unfair, both as expected, yet the 
activity in Sony fell into none of the pre-
amble categories, and was nonetheless 
held fair; completely confounding ex-
pectations, Nation dealt with protected 
“news reporting,” but nonetheless held 
against fair use.
The second factor likewise produces 
disparate results.  Abend unsurprisingly 
disallows fair use for a highly creative 
work, yet Campbell and Sony allow 
the use for similarly creative works; 
and Nation seems totally out of kilter, 
disallowing fair use for a factual work.  
The third factor is likewise mixed. 
Campbell allows fair use for less than 
total copying, but Nation and Abend 
both disallow fair use for less than total 
copying; by contrast, Sony allows fair 
use for total copying!
Nimmer goes on to consider how the 
“functional test” fares better as an explana-
tion for the outcomes of these four cases and 
concludes: “then the fourth factor, as expanded 
by the functional test, is currently the most 
reliable touchstone for performing fair use 
analysis.”  One wonders why the appeals 
courts in the Ninth and Fourth Circuits did 
not follow Nimmer’s lead, or the suggestions 
of both Leval and Weinreb about injunctions 
and compulsory licenses, rather than stretch the 
applicability of “transformative use” beyond 
its ordinary-language limits.  That would have 
been an intellectually more honest and satis-
factory way of reaching the conclusions they 
wanted to reach about the public interest and 
saved them from sometimes very contorted 
reasoning that betrays the special pleading in 
which they were manifestly engaged.
Why should anyone care about how these 
courts reached their decisions?  There are, in 
fact, very good reasons for university presses, 
indeed all publishers, to be concerned.  If the 
Google Settlement comes undone, perhaps 
under pressure from the Justice Department 
about its anti-trust implications (which seems 
more possible than ever in light of recently an-
nounced changes in that Department’s strategy 
for dealing with anti-trust issues, where its 
potential impact on Google was mentioned 
in news stories reporting the change), the suit 
against Google will presumably resume in the 
Second Circuit.  For publishers’ sake, we may 
hope that the Second Circuit stays true to Judge 
Leval’s concept of “transformative use” and 
does not depart down the dangerous path that the 
Ninth Circuit has taken.  If it does, Google may 
yet lose its battle in court over fair use.  But the 
risk remains that the west coast disease, having 
now spread eastward to the Fourth Circuit, will 
begin infecting judges in the Second Circuit as 
well.  (Some signs of the disease having already 
begun to spread further may indeed be found 
in both the Bill Graham Archives and Video 
Pipeline cases, which cite Kelly approvingly). 
If that happens, all bets are off.
But this is not the only suit that stands in 
jeopardy from this spreading disease.  The 
Fifth Circuit now has under consideration the 
suit brought by two university presses, joined 
by a commercial academic publisher, against 
Georgia State University for its alleged in-
fringing activities in providing unauthorized 
copies of publications to students through its 
course-management, e-reserve, and other edu-
cational systems.  But can coursepack copying 
really be construed as fair?  Copyright expert 
Jonathan Band, in the white paper titled 
“Educational Fair Use Today” (December 
2007) prepared for the ARL, believes that it 
can indeed be construed as fair if interpreted 
under the rubric of “transformative use,” as 
that was explicated especially in the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Perfect 10.  According to 
Band, “an educational use of an entertainment 
product is transformative because the work 
is being repurposed….[and], when a teacher 
reproduces a poem, a sound recording, or a 
photograph so that his students can study the 
work, his use is transformative” — as though, 
magically, merely making copies available to 
students somehow adds value to them because 
of the new context of their use.  He further 
suggests that “tools like Blackboard permit 
an instructor to create an online anthology for 
a class, including copyrighted works, commen-
tary, lecture notes, and student reactions” and 
“this recontextualization appears to provide a 
stronger fair use defense than would a library-
run e-reserves containing just the plain text of 
works.”  This theory would also presumably 
sanction publishing such an anthology online 
through the library or an institutional reposi-
tory, eliminating the need for any permission-
ing of the copyrighted contents.  Band does 
admit that “the repurposing argument provides 
less protection with respect to works that target 
the education market,” but he goes on to dis-
tinguish in this respect textbooks from journal 
articles and academic books.  Journal articles, 
he asserts, have scholars as their primary audi-
ence and “because undergraduates are not the 
target audience of journal articles, inclusion of 
such articles in e-reserves or a course Website 
might well be treated as a form of repurpos-
ing.”  Academic books, he believes, fall in a 
middle ground, “but even if the book is aimed 
to some extent at the student market, a course 
Website could recontextualize the book.”  (For 
my full critique of Band’s position, see my 
article titled “What Is Educational Fair Use? 
in Against the Grain, April 2008).  If judges in 
the Fifth Circuit catch the Ninth Circuit disease, 
then the outcome of this suit may well not 
favor publishers’ interests.  On the other hand, 
Nimmer’s “functional test,” emphasizing the 
key role of the fourth factor, would likely result 
in an outcome favorable to publishers, and 
even the suggestions forwarded by Leval and 
Weinreb with regard to compulsory licensing, 
while not an ideal solution from a publisher’s 
point of view, would respect the copyright 
ownership of the authors and their publishers 
by recognizing their legitimate interests in a 
return on their investment.
To conclude, my modest proposal is that 
judges in all of the other nine circuits outside 
the Ninth and Fourth don the metaphori-
cal equivalent of surgical masks to reduce 
the risk of their exposure to the west coast 
disease.  
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